It was a wonderfully beautiful day, with a slight and varying but reasonably favorable breeze at last: the sun blazed on the various kinds of broom in fl ower, upon the Rock, upon the cistuses and giant heath, while an uninterrupted stream of migrant birds, honey buzzards, black kites, all the European vultures, storks both black and white, bee eaters, hoopoes and countless hirundines fl owed across the sky . . . 1
unbounded sea '. 4 No doubt, the wine-dark sea is not only a place full of mystery and imagination, of adventurous sensations and the sentiment of the unrivalled beauty of Mediterranean shores and sunsets, 5 closely associated with a profound and somewhat melancholic joie de vivre. It entails darker allusions to blood and suff ering, too. Indeed, in order to capture an image of the whole range of human emotions, aspirations, and the essentials of human existence as such, merging the concepts of 'wine', 'dark', and 'sea' is a particularly fortunate choice. It is hence not surprising that men and women of letters have frequently made reference to this three-word epithet 6 -among them quite prominently Patrick O'Brian in the sixteenth volume 7 of his masterly tales of the seafaring adventures of Royal Navy Captain Jack Aubrey and his ship's surgeon Stephen Maturin, one of the absolute favourite readings of my teacher and friend Bruno Simma in recent years.
II. Th e Sea of Darkness
From time immemorial, the open sea has attracted both great fear and respect as well as the curiosity of the restless, questing mind of courageous men. Pursuing his temerarious vision to reach the promised land in the east by sailing west into a vast mare incognito and driven by the 'wish to know the secrets of the world', 8 a man like Christopher Columbus could conquer the 'Sea of Darkness', 9 in blatant disregard of the most serious warnings. In the somewhat dramatic and fl owery words of the prominent twelfth century Arab cartographer and geographer Al-Idrisi: 10 Personne ne sait qui existe au-delà de cette mer, personne n'a pu rien en apprendre de certain, à cause de diffi cultés qu'opposent à la navigation la profondeur des ténébres, 4 Th e Odyssey of Homer (TE Lawrence (tr), Oxford University Press, 1991) Book VII, 101. 5 Obviously playing on Homer's Mediterranean-related epithet 'the wine-dark sea', and in a striking contrast thereto, James Joyce, in the opening chapter of his epic novel Ulysses (1922) makes use of the phrase 'the snot-green sea' when Buck Mulligan and Stephen Dedalus proceed to look out over Dublin Bay, and Stephen is reminded of his deceased mother, for whom he is visibly still in mourning.
6 Th e title of the series of stories by Leonardo Sciascia about his native Sicily (Th e Wine-dark Sea [original title: Il mare colore del vino]) eg, plays to the darker sides of the concept, whereas Th omas Cahill's Sailing the Wine Dark Sea: Why the Greeks Matter (Random House, 2004) , an elegant introduction to Greek life and thought, uses the phrase instead 'to invoke an air of mystery' (WJ Rayment, 'Th e Wine Dark Sea' <http://www.indepthinfo.com/articles/wine-dark-sea.shtml> accessed 17 October 2010). 7 P O'Brian, Th e Wine-Dark Sea (HarperCollins, 1993) . Th e whole series amounts to a total of 20 volumes . In 2004, an unfi nished twenty-fi rst volume was published posthumously (Th e Final Unfi nished Voyage of Jack Aubrey). 8 C Colón [C Columbus], Libro de las profecías (1501) Fol 4: 'La mesma arte [of navigation] inclina a quien le prosigue a desear de saber los secretos d'este mundo' (cited from the 1992 edition, edited, annotated and translated into Spanish by Kay Brigham, at 33). 9 Designation coined by medieval Arab geographers for the Atlantic Ocean. See, in particular, Mohammed al Idrisi (1100-1165), who, in his Kitāb nuzhat al-mushtāq fī ikhtirāq al-āfāq (A Diversion for the Man Longing to Travel to Far-Off Places-commonly referred to as the 'Book of Roger', 1154 (see also nn 10 and 11 below)), makes frequent reference to the 'mer ténébreuse'. 10 For further information on the man and his epochal work see AS Maqbul, 'Cartography of al-Sharīf al-Idrīsī' in JB Harley and D Woodward (eds), Th e History of Cartography, Vol 2, Book 1, Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies (University of Chicago Press, 1992) la hauteur des vagues, la fréquence des tempêtes, la multiplicité des animaux monstreux et la violence des vents. 11
Mythological water creatures and sea monsters of all kinds have indeed not only been an almost indispensable descriptive tool of map-makers until the advent of modern cartography in the eighteenth century. 12 Accounts by many a sailor of seeing strange creatures while on the high seas persist even to this day. 13 No doubt, seafaring men and (much less) women 14 were exposed to a wide range of deadly risks and dangers, both natural in character and man-made: devastating storms and other meteorological misfortunes claimed lives and values at sea as did navigational errors, diseases, and encounters with hostile naval forces. Finally, a most faithful companion of almost all journeys, at almost all times and almost everywhere in the world, 15 was the fear of sea raids by pirates. No wonder, therefore, that ever since the sea began to serve as a vital space for commercial, political, military, and cultural communication among peoples, securing the safety of sea lanes became a matter of common concern and continues to do so up to the present day. 16 Over time, some of these scourges were erased or at least reduced to a tolerable risk. Surprisingly though, 17 this is not the case with regard to the phenomenon of maritime piracy, which has terrorized the sea since time immemorial. Th e number of attacks worldwide having increased more than tenfold in the past two decades, 18 the pirate menace has always constituted a challenge not only for seafaring nations, indiscriminately exposed to the peril of being set upon by these 'pernicious people' (Patrick O'Brian). Rather, as long as the oceans have been plied for commerce, it has aff ected all those who benefi t from seafaring-so, virtually the international community as a whole. Hence, from this perspective good reasons may indeed exist for pirates to be labelled 'Hostis Humani Generis' (enemies of mankind), a concept credited to the Roman lawyer, statesman, and political theorist Marcus Tullius Cicero. 19
III. A Th in Red Line
In a much-noticed contribution to the European Journal of International Law, Bruno Simma once argued that in the case of Kosovo it was only 'a thin red line' which separated NATO's action from international legality. 20 Coined by William Russell, correspondent for Th e Times during the Crimean War, 21 the expression 'thin red streak tipped with a line of steel' soon became popularized into 'the thin red line'. 22 What Russell described at the occasion of the 1854 battle of Balaklava 19 In a speech prepared for the highly politically charged trial held in Rome in 70 BC against the corrupt and brutal former Governor of Sicilia, Gaius Verres, Cicero had held, inter alia (Actionis in C Verrem Secundae Liber Quartus/ Secondary Orations Against Verres: 'Fecisti item ut praedones solent; qui cum hostes communes sint omnium, tamen aliquos sibi instituunt amicos, quibus non modo parcant verum etiam praeda quos augeant . . .' ('You acted as pirates are accustomed to act, who, though they are the common enemies of all men, still select some friends, whom they not only spare, but even enrich with their booty'). Th e concept as such has never ceased to exist (see from twentieth century court practice, eg, the Privy Council (In re Piracy jure gentium [1934] AC 586) and the famous dictum in Filartiga v Pena-Iralam, 630 F 2d 876 (1980): 'Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind' and it appears that it is even experiencing a certain renaissance in recent times. 20 B Simma, 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects' (1999) 10 Eur J Intl L 22. 21 Russell (1820-1907) was not only one of the fi rst war correspondents, but today many consider him one of the most important members of his profession et al. His most enduring professional legacy is indeed his telegraphic dispatches from the Crimea, in which he depicted a most realistic picture of the realities of war.
22 Th e 1962 novel by James Jones, A Th in Red Line, refers to the Guadalcanal campaign in the Second World War and was adapted for Hollywood motion pictures twice (in 1964 and 1998). was an unorthodox and quite hazardous tactical move by the then commander of the 93rd British Regiment. 23 Sir Colin Campbell ordered his Sutherland Highlanders to receive the Russian cavalry charge with a 'thin' line of infantry soldiers wearing the (red) Royal Stewart tartan rather than with the traditional 'thick' and immobile square formation. Th is courageous as well as smart decision proved to be a most fortunate one. And so is Bruno Simma's fi gurative use of this very concept: experience and history teach us that the threshold between good and bad, between right and wrong, and between legal and illegal is not as easy to determine as many all too self-confi dent observers, in particular from the legal professions and the political arena, try to make us believe. Th is is not only true with respect to the most sensitive and delicate issue of the use of military force in (traditional) inter-State relations, 24 but probably even more so when it comes to the legal assessment of the various manifestations of 'low-level' forcible actions. Two episodes may further illustrate this point. Not surprisingly, the fi rst, fi ctional one is borrowed from the Aubrey-Maturin series. 25
Heavily damaged by an undersea volcanic eruption somewhere in the infi nite vastness of the South Pacifi c, the American privateer Franklin, owned by the French Jean Dutourd, a wealthy philanthropist, was easy prey for Captain Jack Aubrey's elderly 28-gun frigate HMS Surprise. In pursuance of his Rousseaunian dream to colonize a South Pacifi c island, Moahu, and establish there a terrestrial paradise of equality, justice, and little labour, Dutourd had taken several British ships as prizes. After his arrest, Dutourd was brought before Captain Aubrey and handed over to him a complete set of offi cial (ship's) papers wrapped in sailcloth: 'Jack looked through them with satisfaction; then frowned and looked though the parcels again.' 26 Th ereafter, the following memorable dialogue unfolds: 'But where is your commission, or letter of marque?' 'I have no commission or letter of marque, sir,' replied Dutourd, shaking his head and smiling a bit. 'I am only a private citizen, not a naval offi cer. My sole purpose was to found a colony for the benefi t of mankind.'
'No commission, either American or French?'
23 Th e tactics of the time for the British Army had the infantry stand four deep to present a rolling volley by line. To receive a cavalry charge they would form into a square to protect themselves as the cavalry charge would easily break a line of infantry. Colonel Colin Campbell was so contemptuous of the Russian Cavalry that he deployed his men into only two lines, not four, to cover more ground and present more fi repower per volley and did not form a square. 24 Indeed, as Bruno Simma somehow predicted, once rather solid red lines are about to disintegrate. Triggered by the 2005 UN World Summit (Outcome Document A/60/L.1, paras 138, 139), we currently witness the emergence of a normative obligation of the international community to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity 'No, no. It never occurred to me to solicit one. Is it looked upon as a necessary formality?' 'Very much so.' 'I remember having received a letter from the Minister of Marine wishing me every happiness on my voyage; perhaps that would answer?' 'I am afraid not, sir. Your happiness has included the taking of several prizes, I collect?' 'Why, yes, sir. You will not think me impertinent if I observe that our countries, alas, are in a state of war.' 'So I understand. But wars are conducted according to certain forms. Th ey are not wild riots in which anyone may join and seize whatever he can overpower; and I fear that if you can produce nothing better than the recollection of a letter wishing you every happiness you must be hanged as a pirate.' 'I am concerned to hear it . . . '
Th e basic message of this wonderful dialogue is still very familiar to us: 'wars are conducted to certain forms. Th ey are not wild riots . . .' During the Napoleonic Wars, the historical setting of the Aubrey/Maturin saga, the answer to the question how to treat those who were not able or willing to observe the necessary formalities, was quite simple: they were destined to hang from the yardarm. 27 However, can one really draw a straight line from the alleged 'proto-terrorist', 28 29 Captain Aubrey instead is nicknamed 'Lucky Jack', not least for his knack for capturing valuable prizes-an activity in fact not much diff erent to that pursued by Dutourd; yet on the proper side of the 'red line'. 30 Pavlischek, Human Rights and Justice in an Age of Terror (n 28).
quite arbitrarily, giving absolute priority to the national interest. Unfortunately, the then Mexican government did not resist this temptation.
In the mid-1830s, the struggle for dominion over Texas (and Coahuila), torn between Mexican (restorative) claims, American territorial aspirations, and separatist and revolutionary dreams, came to a bloody end. In the rather unclear political and military situation of the day, the then Mexican President General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, a most controversial personality (to say the least), 31 took a rather drastic decision: he induced the Mexican Congress to approve on 30 December 1835 the so-called 'Tornel Decree'. 32 Th e key provisions of this legislative act read as follows:
. . . anxious to repress these aggressions which constitute not only an off ense to the sovereignty of the Mexican nation, but also to evident violation of international laws as they are generally adopted, has ordered the following decrees to be enforced. Foreigners landing on the coast of the republic or invading its territory by land, 1.
armed with the intention of attacking our country, will be deemed pirates and dealt with as such, being citizens of no nation presently at war with the republic, and fi ghting under no recognized fl ag.
All foreigners who will import either by sea or land, in the places occupied by 2.
the rebels, either arms or ammunition of any kind for the use of them, will be deemed pirates and punished as such. 33
In short: in the absence of an offi cial state of war between Mexico and any other nation-in particular the United States (US)-all those entering Mexican soil with a hostile intent vis-à-vis the Mexican authorities were simply, by virtue of law, branded as pirates. A fairly typical civil war situation with a certain degree of foreign intervention was thus relabelled as a battle between good and evil, between the lawful and the lawless; the latter facing summary execution, as was the customary punishment for pirates at the time. Recalling this brutal story is, however, not just an attempt to recapture the attention of the exhausted reader. It is likely to teach us at least two lessons.
First, the volleys of Goliad (together with the fall of Alamo just a couple of days before) were crucial for Mexico losing a war which it had actually already won: branded with a reputation of cruelty, opinion in the US instantaneously turned against Mexico, while the Texan cause experienced a rather unexpected boost. Soon after, with the legendary rallying cry on their lips 'Remember the Alamo! Remember Goliad!', the Texas army infl icted a heavy defeat on the Mexican troops in the decisive battle of San Jacinto (21 April 1836). Given the strategic situation at the outset of the battle, this surprising victory paved the way for the (temporary 38 ) independence of the Republic of Texas. In view of the 'rallying eff ects' 39 of the infamous outlawry of the adversary, one may well call this a self-infl icted defeat. Parallels with current events are intended. 40
Th e episode just sketched may spur a second refl ection: in a rather diff erent, however probably transferable context, Bruno Simma once remarked, 'in this area they 36 Battle of Coleto (19-20 March 1836). 37 For a full account of the dramatic events see, with an extensive bibliography, 'Goliad Massacre: Th e Handbook of Texas Online' <http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/GG/qeg2 .html> accessed 17 October 2010.
38 Many expected the new-born Republic of Texas to join the Union immediately, it was but ten years later, in 1845, that Texas was annexed to the US becoming the Union's 28th state.
39 Th e eff ect is well known and narrated, eg, by Shakespeare in his history play Henry V. in the context of the battle of Agincourt (25 October 1415). Victory very much uncertain, the king is reported to have rallied his outnumbered troops with the famous motivational words (St Crispin's Day Speech: Act IV, Scene 3):
Th is story shall the good man teach his son; And Crispin Crispian shall ne'er go by, From this day to the ending of the world, But we in it shall be remember'd;
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers . . . Welded together by such powerful words, France was indeed brought to her knees in this decisive encounter of the Hundred Years' War. Coincidentally, the 1854 battle of Balaklava, referred to above, occurred on the same calendar date: St Crispin's day. 40 At this point, it may fi t to recall GWF Hegel's famous and rather pessimistic dictum: 'what experience and history teach is this-that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it' (Th e Philosophy of History, Introduction (J Sibree (tr), Batoche Books, 2001) 19).
[the States] will always bear a similarity with foxes guarding the chicken'. 41 Th e Tornel Decree is but one extreme, though anything but rare, example of how the powers to make and interpret the law may be abused if left to the discretion of one interested party alone. It may therefore be legitimate to ask (and question) whether States are indeed still the best defi ners for rules which no longer only aff ect their relationship inter se. At times, when the participation of non-State actors in 'armed confl icts' 42 (often enough on a par in terms of military capabilities with their State counterparts) is rather the rule than an exception, 43 we should no longer take it for granted that the ascertainment of the various facets of the legitimacy issue is entrusted to anything but impartial actors. Let us not fool ourselves: States are not interested in a considerable legal upgrading of those who challenge their traditional monopoly on the use of force. Quite the contrary: the more the traditional masters of the international systems feel threatened by non-State actors, the more they are inclined to resort to the radical verdict of outlawry. A common feature of older legal systems, the declaration that somebody, considered a society's outcast, operates outside the community of man and has to be treated accordingly, 44 has never really ceased to exist. 45 However, in view of considerably intensifi ed attempts in recent times to revitalize the concept of outlawry in order to provide an 'adequate' extralegal and extrajudicial answer to the phenomenon of terrorism, the 'Goliad experience' may well serve as a cautionary tale.
It is indeed but a thin, sometimes hardly visible, and arbitrary line which divides the overlapping and intermingling spheres of pirates and privateers, 46 between freedom fi ghters, insurgents, and terrorists, between 'social' bandits and ordinary criminals, between blood-mongering dictators of (almost) failed States and the hardly less ruthless regime of rebellious leaders of non-recognized territorial enti- ties, and fi nally between legal participants in warfare and those who are denied this status. Beyond the textbooks, that is in the real world, to label somebody as falling into one of these (or a number of similar) categories has never really been a clear-cut decision-and even less so in recent times. A whole bunch of factors comes into play, among them quite prominently the time and place of the activity in question, its object and purpose or political, sometimes rather opportunistic, considerations. A high degree of unpredictability and arbitrariness is added by the fact that much depends on who is called upon to decide on which side of the thin red line an alleged perpetrator is to be placed-with all too often virtually fatal consequences. Th e famous dialogue between Alexander the Great and his pirate prisoner Dionides is but one early example of the inconsistencies in the formulation and the application of the law on the legality of the use of force: . And he concludes: 'It is only in folk-tales, children's stories and the journals of intellectual opinion that power is used wisely and well to destroy evil. Th e real world teaches very diff erent lessons, and it takes willful ignorance to fail to perceive them' (ibid, 144). In this respect, reference may only be made to another highly disputed study: G Kolko, Politics of War (Random House, 1969).
49 Th e wording of the September 2002 US National Security Strategy indeed bears striking similarities to century-old patterns of thought: 'Th e purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specifi c threat to the United States or our allies and friends. Th e reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.' 50 C Pye, Th e Regal Phantasm: Shakespeare and the Politics of Spectacle (Routledge, 1990) 133. 51 Shakespeare's historical play (circa 1599) is indeed full of allusions to Dionides' bold this kind of tacit complicity is still very much alive today. Th e leitmotif in international as well as national politics of the royal or-in modern parlance-sovereign prerogative to transcend the law-or at least to make it perfectly suit the ruler's interests-is thus of enduring timeliness.
Yet, the rather selective ban on the use of force, granting a somewhat privileged position to the 'terror of the powerful' (Winston Churchill), 52 becomes even more dubious in times impressed by a 'spirit of morality', such as we all pretend to live in under the constitutional umbrella of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). 53 Law, as most of us might probably agree today, 'cannot be built on law' (alone) but must be supported by an internal morality validated by external moral attitudes, as Lon Fuller has put it in his seminal reply 54 to HLA Hart's positivist conception. 55 If, however, the integration of law and morality is the demand of the day, how can one seriously expect actors below the threshold of Statehood to renounce the use of forcible means in order to pursue their objectives, if States do not set a good example in this respect? In concrete terms, what is needed is an intellectual framework for an all-embracing, coherent, and hopefully 'abolitionist' approach regarding the use of force as such, no matter who makes use of it and no matter for what purpose. In this respect, the (international) law as it stands at the moment rests obviously on rather shaky ground.
Our uncomfortable feelings are shared by Stephen Maturin, Jack Aubrey's friend, ship's surgeon and natural philosopher alike. Th e following is an excerpt from one of the many conversations between the two men during their epic voyage:
I am coming to believe that laws are the prime cause of unhappiness. . . . Th ere are parallel sets of laws in diff erent keys that have nothing to do with one another and that are even downright contradictory. It seems to me that the greater mass of confusion and distress must arise from these less evident divergencies-the moral law, the civil, military, common laws, the code of honour, custom, the rules of practical life, of civility, of amorous conversation, gallantry, to say nothing of Christianity for those who practice it. All sometimes, indeed generally, at variance; none ever in an entirely harmonious relation to the rest; and a man is perpetually required to choose comparison and its implications; cf, with further references, Spencer, 'Princes, Pirates, and Pigs' (n 47). 52 'Th e rich and powerful have every right to demand that they be left in peace to enjoy what they have gained, often by violence and terror; the rest can be ignored as long as they suff er in silence, but if they interfere with the lives of those who rule the world by right, the "terrors of the earth" will be visited upon them with righteous wrath, unless power is constrained from within' (cited by Chomsky, Pirates and Emperors (n 48) 17). one rather than another, perhaps . . . its contrary. It is as though our strings were each tuned according to a completely separate system . . . 56
It is to be hoped that we would not go as far as Maturin in considering the subject to which we have devoted our professional lives, 'the prime cause of unhappiness'. However, discrepancies, incoherencies, and-above all-injustices in the formulation and application of the law are indeed a prime cause for the failure of a peaceful (political) solution of confl icts, most of which are essentially socio-economic in character. Th e beating policeman will be of little help for dispute resolution in suburban ghettos, just as Israel's eff orts to 'bomb away' the Hamas problem is a costly, yet obviously futile approach. And fi nally, it is more than doubtful whether force (alone) is an adequate means to combat eff ectively both terrorism and piracy. As history aptly demonstrates, the latter at least will fl ourish whenever men (and occasionally) women are motivated to become pirates for economic reasons. Forcible means may curtail lawlessness at sea, for a certain period, in certain regions, and with respect to its intensity. However, they will never succeed in eff ectively erasing the problem as such.
Assistance for a better understanding of present day problems and (we must hope) their solution sometimes surfaces in the most surprising of seas. In the autumn of 68 BC, the Roman Republic suff ered a humiliating blow which bears many similarities to the devastating 9/11 terrorist attacks. Aiming at the very heart of the then only Mediterranean superpower, the ancient Roman port city of Ostia was plundered, set on fi re, the Roman fl eet destroyed, and several high-ranking State offi cials (the praetors Sextilius and Bellinus) taken hostage. 57 Whereas the identity of those responsible for this spectacular assault was well known to all, the qualifi cation of their legal and political status was not as clear. In the panicky aftermath of the daring attack, the virtually unequivocal outlawry of the aggressors ('Cilician Pirates' 58 ) was probably an inevitable refl ex. However, a more reasoned and balanced view of these 'pernicious people'-such as that undertaken by the highly infl uential German historian Th eodor Mommsen in the mid-nineteenth century-may arrive at a diff erent and rather surprising assessment. At the time, Mommsen writes, '[p]iracy had totally changed its character . . . they formed now a piratical state, with a peculiar esprit de corps, with a solid and very respectable organization, with a home of their own and the germs of symmachy, and doubtless also with a defi nite political designs'. ' [T] he ruined men of all nations', he continues, 'was no longer a gang of robbers who had fl ocked together, but a compact soldier-state, in which the freemasonry of exile and crime took the place of nationality . . .' And after spending some time on the specifi c characteristics of this 'settled political entity', he concludes the argument by asking himself whether this State 'was much worse than those of the Italian Oligarchy and the Oriental sultanship, which seemed in the fair way of dividing the world between them'. 59 Mommsen's characterization may not be free of romanticism. However, the case aptly demonstrates that even seemingly clear-cut cases often deserve a second look: at diff erent times, by diff erent people, and, in particular, from a diff erent and probably more impartial angle. 60 And in fact, as more recent studies suggest, the Cilicians might indeed have been a regular enemy and the piracy label thus no more than a rather successful defamation by the effi cient and well-oiled Roman propaganda machinery. 61 To label somebody pirate, terrorist, illegal or enemy combatant who simply is at variance with the modalities of conventional warfare, as practised by the 'powerful', may be a tried and tested means to delegitimize the Other. 62 However, the result may not necessarily hold up to a rigorous scrutiny of facts.
In our context, however, the true lesson to be learnt from the Cilician causetoday almost obfuscated by the long shadow of history-is probably the following. Surprisingly enough, after decade-long costly and futile eff orts successfully to clear the 'mare nostrum' 63 of this major menace for the security of shipping as well as of coastal areas, 64 Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus succeeded in eradicating piracy from the Mediterranean in less than three months. To be sure, Pompey had at least 270 ships 65 and 120,000 soldiers at his disposal and the warrior-general was vested with almost unlimited power by virtue of the Lex Gabinia, 66 a legislative act which has been considered 'the beginning of the end of the Roman Republic'. 67 It is an open question whether the 'war on (pirate) terror' really 'fatally subvert[ed] the institution it was supposed to protect', as Robert Harris suggests. 68 However, once again, should we be careful not to repeat the ruinous errors of our remote ancestors?
Yet, Rome owes the lasting success of this military campaign not to the rather common ingredients of successful warfare: a well-equipped armoury and legal and political measures to allow for as much freedom of action as possible for the belligerents and their leaders. Rome defi nitively won this war-and not just a battle-by the way it treated its enemies after the din of battle was hushed and the Cilicians had surrendered in great numbers. On the approach eventually adopted by Pompey we are in possession of the following report:
Th e war was therefore brought to an end and all piracy driven from the sea in less than three months, and besides many other ships, Pompey received in surrender ninety which had brazen beaks. Th e men themselves, who were more than twenty thousand in number, he did not once think of putting to death; and yet to let them go and suff er them to disperse or band together again, poor, warlike, and numerous as they were, he thought was not well. Refl ecting, therefore, that by nature man neither is nor becomes a wild or an unsocial creature, but is transformed by the unnatural practice of vice, whereas he may be softened by new customs and a change of place and life; also that even wild beasts put off their fi erce and savage ways when they partake of a gentler mode of life, he determined to transfer the men from the sea to land, and let them have a taste of gentle life by being accustomed to dwell in cities and to till the ground. Some of them, therefore, were received and incorporated into the small and half-deserted cities of Cilicia, which acquired additional territory; and after restoring the city of Soli, which had lately been devastated by Tigranes, the king of Armenia, Pompey settled many there. To most of them, however, he gave as residence Dyme in Achaea, which was then bereft of men and had much good land. 69 65 Figure given Distortions for political reasons being one of the most distinctive features of Roman historiography, it is hardly astonishing that reactions to this unusual and surprising 'humanitarian' approach ranged from harsh criticism (Plutarch) to lively approval (Cicero). 70 Th e very complimentary picture painted by Cicero and others of Pompey's human attitudes may not entirely correspond with reality. However, it is probably unquestionable that Pompey's vision of turning former enemies into useful citizens tackled the problem at its roots. What the Roman General did was to treat the phenomenon of piracy as what it in fact primarily was-a socio-economic problem. Pompey's quest for a comprehensive solution, including a long-term plan for the reintegration of the 'outlaws', proved to be extremely successful. For the fi rst time in many centuries, the piracy scourge in the Mediterranean was almost 71 completely eradicated, and a huge liability to Roman and Hellenistic sea commerce 72 was brought to a rather unexpectedly speedy end.
Certainly, the way in which Pompey led his campaign against the Cilician pirates cannot serve as an exact blueprint for present-day politicians confronted with similar challenges. However, the story and its main protagonist, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus-accorded hardly more than a marginal footnote in today's textbooks on Roman history-may still remind us that for lawyers and politicians alike, taking a fresh look at old problems and their solution may produce surprising results. In a rapidly changing world, a mainstream clinging to deep-seated and habituated legal and political concepts and approaches is instead always in danger of leading to a dead end. In all likelihood, by ruthlessly hanging the roughly 20,000 pirate prisoners, Pompey might have earned the immediate and undivided approval of the Roman people and their representatives. However, recourse to this more traditional and well-established handling of the problem would have been very unlikely to help him win the 'war on piracy'-an experience which his great rival, Julius Gaius Caesar, underwent just a couple of years before. 73 It is good to know that Bruno Simma would most likely have acted as Pompey did more than 2,000 years ago.
Indeed, Bruno Simma has always advocated breaking new legal ground and exploring new political paths in order to reconcile changing realities with the imperatives of the (international) legal order. He did so, for example, in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo crisis, when he qualifi ed the NATO bombardments 70 Tröster, 'Roman Hegemony and Non-State Violence' (n 61) 24 et seq. 71 Th e pirates remained, however, a (low-level) nuisance to shipping: de Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World (n 64) 176 et seq. 72 In fact, by that time piracy activities, including the control of an estimated 400 coastal cities, had brought commerce over most of the Mediterranean to a virtual stand-still, aff ecting in particular Rome's grain supply from Egypt, something of vital importance for social and political stability in the Republic's capital. 73 Caesar's famous encounter with the Cilician pirates and its merciless aftermath is reported by Plutarch, Life of Julius Caesar, ch 2. as (just) a 'venial sin'. 74 In the Roman Catholic tradition, to which Bruno Simma is intimately tied in some sort of love-hate relationship, this lesser, forgivable sin is something which makes the transgressor balance on the very thin line between paradise and hell, eventually off ering him the chance to escape eternal damnation. 75 Bruno Simma's vision of the law is thus certainly no Dantean scenario in the vestibule of hell: 'All hope abandon ye who enter here.' 76 He is rather convinced that a rigid 'binary understanding of permission/prohibition' does not do justice to the present day's architecture of international law and in fact disregards 'the great shades of nuance that permeate international law'. 77 No doubt, one of Bruno Simma's main concerns has always been to avoid international law becoming some sort of Procrustean bed, in which the real world is squeezed into by more or less forcible means. 78 One of the ever-growing shades obfuscating traditional international law is certainly the appearance in the international arena of the single human being. No longer contenting himself with existence in the carefully fenced backyard of the glittering State, the individual is about to take central stage. We must make sureand I know Bruno Simma is by my side-that the corpus of human rights is not degraded to a 'user-friendly' vocabulary of power, a tool easily misusable and abusable for selective and arbitrary exclusions by individual States as well as by the international (State) community as a whole. We must insist that 'outlaws', 'illegals', and 'pernicious' people of all kind are probably those most in need of protection by international (legal) standards, at any time, in all places, and under all circumstances.
Would it not then be 'more intellectually satisfying' 79 to explore entirely new legal avenues in order to give full eff ect to human rights regimes-in cases of necessity even without the consent of the State(s) concerned? In an entirely diff erent context, Bruno Simma has recently expressed his uneasiness with the International
